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between Christ's divine and human nature. Cyril's concern for the unity 
of Christ's person are well known; he rejects this type of solution, hold-
ing that the unity of the person Christ allows that the human attributes 
of Jesus can also be attributed to the divine so that it is appropriate to say 
that in Christ, God suffers. Gavrilyuk develops the nuances of this posi-
tion far more than can be elaborated here; however, Cyril's position ends 
up being something like this: God does not suffer in the divine nature or 
"nakedly" (gymnos). However, in the person of Christ, God does allow 
sufferings to come upon him and truly to become God's own. In Christ's 
divine self-limitation it can be said that God suffers. Suffering then is 
part of the economy of God's relation to the world rather than an expres-
sion of divine nature. 
Gavrilyuk's book joins other recent books arguing for qualified passi-
bility adding historical nuance to positions that have perhaps been both 
mischaracterized and unfairly dismissed. Gavrilyuk's book effectively 
undercuts much of the historical case against qualified impassibility and 
here the work shines brightest. Championing the orthodox case, he re-
covers a viable aspect of the tradition. However, since the book ends with 
Cyril it does not set up a dialogue with the most notable proponent of 
contemporary thought on the issue of God's suffering, Jurgen Moltmann. 
Gavrilyuk's book sets the stage for a comparison between Moltmann 
and Cyril. One question begs to be addressed: is Cyril's picture of the 
suffering of God in Christ an adequate response to the sufferings of the 
modern world? Gavrilyuk presents us with the tantalizing notion that 
this modern quandary has a rich, fruitful response dwelling within the 
Christian tradition. 
Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, edited by Paul Helm and Oliver 
D. Crisp. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003. Pp. xvi and 
165. $99.95 (cloth), $29.95 (paper). 
JAMIE SCHILLINGER, St. Olaf College 
Given the relative lack of philosophical attention amid the more general 
proliferation of scholarship in the humanities on Edwards, the efforts of 
the ten contributors to this collection of essays are timely. Published on 
the tercentenary date of Edwards' birth, the introduction to the collection 
states that it addresses the need for further reflection on the possible nexus 
of theologians' and philosophers' work on Edwards. The collection, in my 
judgment, begins to fulfill this need, though in a piecemeal and limited 
manner. Quite apart from its overall impact, Jonathan Edwards: Philosophi-
cal Theologian contains a number of individual essays of significant inter-
est to those concerned with philosophical and systematic theology. The 
collection contains essays that consider a variety of traditional theological 
doctrines and philosophical topics. Some of the essays concern historical 
or hermeneutic clarification, while others deal with the constructive task 
of defending or critiquing Edwardsian positions. 
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Jonathan Kvanvig's and William Wainwright's essays address Ed-
wards and the doctrine of hell. Both authors agree with Edwards that the 
heart of the best defense of the traditional doctrine turns on a judgment 
about the significance of the status of the one wronged in sin, such that 
since the offended is infinitely great and good, a wrong done against such 
status merits infinite punishment. Kvanvig's essay focuses on whether 
Edwards offered a persuasive defense of the claim that all sin is in fact 
a sin against God, thereby securing one of the key premises in the argu-
ment about status. If, for example, one does not think one believes in 
God, is it appropriate to say that God is nevertheless an object of one's 
actions, and that one's actions should be described as offenses against 
God? Kvanvig's partial answer to such questions draws on the implica-
tions of what he calls Edwards' doctrine of divine conservation. He con-
cludes that "[b]ecause of the intimate dependence, complete and total, 
of things on God, harm to the created order automatically constitutes 
an offense against the being on whom this order completely depends." 
(p. 9) Kvanvig's conclusion strikes me as correct, although two provisos 
ought to be issued. First, it seems to me that Edwards' conception of the 
relation between God and things that are not God, as described in works 
such as End of Creation, is much more theologically rich and complex than 
Kvanvig's conclusion indicates, and that this conception might deepen 
the account that Kvanvig begins to develop. Second, Kvanvig's answer 
deals with only one aspect-what might be called the objective pole-of 
the question with which he begins. As he notes in his conclusion, issues 
concerning moral psychology and related issues concerning how best to 
describe actions remain to be addressed. 
Whereas Kvanvig's account of Edwards on hell is tightly focused 
and somewhat narrow, Wainwright's account is more wide-ranging and 
touches on more trajectories of argument. He defends some of Edwards' 
claims and criticizes others. Among the topics addressed, he attempts to 
defend the status principle-the claim that sin is damnable because of the 
unique status of the one sinned against-against a number of objections, 
he tackles questions about whether one can separate sinners from their 
sin, and touches on the issue of whether because some of the undeserving 
are saved from hell it is therefore an unfair punishment meted out by a 
God of limited mercy. Most importantly, Wainwright argues that Edwards 
is correct to conclude that God must display certain attributes that oppose 
sin, and that hell is one possible manifestation of such actualized opposi-
tion. However, Wainwright also offers two lines of critique of Edwards' 
position. First, he suggests that there are problems with the fairness of the 
doctrine, arguing that it would be more merciful and just as appropriate 
to God's hatred of sin, if sin and unredeemed sinners were simply annihi-
lated instead of being punished eternally. The second line of critique that 
he sets in motion suggests that the doctrine of hell may give rise to trou-
bling theological and philosophical implications about the nature of God. 
On this front, he discusses the relative merits of different metaphors such 
as bridegroom, father, king, and he also mentions that hell may imply that 
God has "hated" certain persons from eternity. Both trajectories of critique 
raise questions and rely on theological premises that are unexplored in the 
essay, presumably due to limitations of space. 
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Since concerns with Edwards' occasionalism resurface through a number 
of the essays, Oliver Crisp's discussion of how best to interpret Edwards' di-
verse statements about the conservation relation between God and the world 
is a key contribution to the collection. Crisp carries out three different tasks: 
(1) he delineates the spectrum of views about conservation and the place of 
secondary causation that extend from strong conservation theses to continu-
ous creation theses to theses of occasionalism; (2) he discusses how Edwards' 
thought can contribute to various contemporary debates about how persons 
persist through time, clarifying how accounts of perdurantism and endu-
rantism might be related to accounts of dense and discrete time; and (3) he 
contests Sang Lee's attempt to argue that Edwards, on the basis of statements 
in the Miscellanies about natural laws, adopted a continuous creation thesis 
as opposed to an occasionalist one. Crisp does not much explore, however, 
the theological purposes that Edwards may have thought his arguments for 
occasionalism served, and the difference such purposes might make. 
Like Crisp's essay, Paul Helm's argument deals with Edwards' occasion-
alism, though he is more explicitly focused on its relation to an insight into 
personal identity that he believes Edwards gleaned from John Locke, name-
ly that personal identity need not be grounded in some kind of simple and 
imperishable soul, but can be understood as an overlapping continuity of 
mental states, centered on an awareness of unity of mental organization 
across time. Locke's account possesses an admirable "forensic focus," that 
Helm seems to approve of for both its epistemological modesty -" memory 
is a rough and ready forensic tool; no more" (p. 48)-and the way it enables 
one to give a metaphysical account of mental unity that includes both im-
manent causation and a world of fluid relations and change. Yet, according 
to Helm, Edwards' commitment to occasionalism and divine immediacy 
"neutralized and sterilized" the promise of Locke's arguments. The critical 
problem for Helm revolves around the absence of a place for immanent cau-
sation in either the discernment of or the constitution of the unity of mental 
organization that Lockean personal identity requires. "[S]ince for Edwards 
there is no fact of the matter (as far as the connection of the present with the 
past is concerned) apart from the will of God, there can be no memories, in 
the strict sense; for a person can remember only what is true. And though, 
if I am an Edwardsian, I may remember having a shower, I cannot truly re-
member having it, for whoever had the shower, it wasn't me." (p. 58) 
While I found Helm's argument thought-provoking, I was not con-
vinced that Helm makes his point precisely enough. To begin with, it 
is unclear whether what Helm calls Locke's "forensic focus" is primar-
ily an epistemological or a metaphysical boon. The most plausible in-
terpretation, it seems to me, must be the metaphysical one. And though 
Helm quite correctly raises the question of how Edwards' metaphysical 
commitments are related to his theological ones, I was not confident that 
he pursued the question far enough. It seems correct to say that on the 
Edwardsian position, the showering Helm isn't a person who endures 
across time instead of perduring, and he certainly isn't an "autonomous-
ly self-perpetuating" subject, the mere product of immanent causation. 
Yet, surely the key conditional clause in Helm's example is "apart from 
the will of God." Thus, the conclusion-that Helm cannot truly remem-
ber having showered, because it wasn't he that showered-ought to be 
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qualified by the condition, "apart from the will of God." In the absence 
of ~,ome analysis of what this clause means, of course it is difficult to 
understand how true identity could be maintained; in the absence of an 
account of how divine being and willing make truth possible, of course 
there are no true connections between time-slices. And this point, for me 
rai5es a much larger question: Should it be surprising that in the absence 
of a great deal more theological reflection, Edwards' philosophical reflec-
tions on personal identity appear unsatisfactory? 
Flugh McCann's essay attempts to untangle Edwards' acute percep-
tions about certain aspects of willing and their relation to a theology of 
divine sovereignty from what he believes to be Edwards' unconvincing ar-
gument against every aspect of the Arminian concept of freedom. The re-
constructed libertarian concept of freedom that McCann wishes to defend 
is Emned of the claim that freedom consists in an agent bringing her own 
acts into existence, ex nihilo, as it were. (The implausibility of such a view, 
of course, is one point that Edwards never tires of hammering home in 
Freedom of the Will.) However, according to McCann, one of Edwards' most 
important claims about freedom-that it is nothing more than the ability 
to act according to the strongest desire of the will- is both inadequate 
and potentially misleading. In order to show how this claim is potentially 
mi:;leading, McCann provides some valuable and careful analysis of argu-
ments about willing, desiring and choice, which, at the very least, advance 
current discussions of Edwards' work. 
McCann argues toward two conclusions. First, he argues that a persua-
sive libertarian account of freedom is available that has room for less am-
bitious kinds of non-caused self-origination that distinguish choices from 
na:ural causal relata, helps define the spontaneity that makes free choices 
distinct from other relata, and makes moral responsibility possible. Sec-
ond, he argues that this account of freedom does not threaten Edwards' 
commitment to divine sovereignty, because God's causation and conser-
vation of the world ought not to be understood as competing with natural 
causes. "The best way to view divine creation is to treat it as akin to hu-
man creation: to hold that instead of being consequences of God's will as 
creator, we and our actions are the content of his will, in much the way the 
characters and events of a novel are the content of the author's imagina-
tion." (p. 41) On this construal, the author transcends her characters, she 
does not compete with them. Thus, if I understand McCann correctly, what 
appears in Edwards' thought to be either determinism or compatibilism is 
more defensible if it is understood as a distinctively theological claim, not 
at all similar to, say, Locke's compatibilism, which isn't concerned with the 
difference theological considerations make for philosophy. 
Philip Quinn's contribution suggests that philosophers can find an im-
portant and original contribution to virtue theory in the first chapter of 
Edwards' treatise on True Virtue. Quinn's article consists of three parts: an 
endorsement of the promise of understanding moral virtue in aesthetic 
terms, a re-presentation (with one very minor revision) of the argument of 
the first chapter of True Virtue, and an argument about whether it can be in-
structive to construe the argument of the first chapter in purely philosoph-
ical and non-theological terms. While the argument is clear and probably 
correct as far as it goes, in my opinion, it is also the case that Quinn does 
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not face up to some of the larger ontological problems that are implicated 
in True Virtue-such as how to understand the relation between being and 
beauty-that have appropriately bedeviled interpreters of Edwards for 
ages. Among the essays by the theologians, the one most interesting to 
philosophers is likely to be Amy Plantinga Pauw's investigation of divine 
simplicity. Edwards' emphasis on excellency and beauty as fundamental 
concepts for thinking about the divine, which are essentially relational and 
pluralistic (and more specifically Trinitarian) according to Plantinga Pauw, 
puts him in contrast to much of the theological tradition's advocacy of sim-
plicity. The issue raised in this essay is provocative; I found myself wishing 
that the author had been even more ambitious and taken up a more de-
tailed comparison with one of simplicity's advocates. In addition to the es-
says mentioned above, the collection also contains Michael McClymond's 
essay on Edwards, Gregory Palamas and the uses of theological platonism, 
Stephen Holmes' essay on Sang Lee's claim that Edwards has a disposi-
tional ontology, and Gerald McDermott's essay comparing Edwards and 
John Henry Newman on the status of non-Christian religions. 
In conclusion, the editors are certainly correct in noting the need for 
more attention to the relation between philosophers of religion and theo-
logians who are interested in Edwards' philosophical theology, and I be-
lieve the book should count as a success in beginning to address this need. 
There are two ways that it might have been even more successful. First, 
it would have been nice if the authors would have engaged more with 
the few other thinkers, such as Stephen H. Daniel, who have given book 
length analyses of Edwards' philosophical theology. Further, in a book 
with contributions from this many first rate philosophical minds, it would 
have been instructive to read more explicit reflection on the challenges of 
bridging the tasks of theology and philosophy, and how Edwards' work 
might represent an instructive moment in the history of Western thought 
for building such bridges. Nonetheless, this further work will be much 
easier for others to pursue with this collection of essays in hand. 
Jonathan Edwards and the Metaphysics of Sin, by Oliver D. Crisp. Hampshire: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005. Pp. x, 146. $89.95. 
GEOFFREY A. GORHAM, University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire 
Rather than an over-arching reading of Edwards's metaphysics, Crisp 
offers detailed critical analysis of several Edwardsian doctrines broadly 
related to sin. His method is not 'rational reconstruction', since he finds 
many of Edwards's positions and arguments inadequate. Instead, Crisp 
adopts what Jonathan Bennett calls the 'collegial approach' to the history 
of philosophy: "one studies the texts in the spirit of a colleague, an an-
tagonist, a student, a teacher-aiming to learn as much philosophy as one 
can from studying them."l This review will consider Crisp's book in the 
same spirit, and draw a similar verdict as Crisp draws about Edwards's 
metaphysics of sin: imperfect but instructive. 
